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Armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina-war crimes-aiding and abetting liability---specific direction-
command responsibility-effective control
PROSECUTOR v. PERIL. Case No. IT-04-81-A. Athttp://www.icty.org.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, February 28, 2013.
On February 28, 2013, the appeals chamber (Chamber) of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) overturned the 2011 conviction of General Momailo
Perigi6, the former head of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), for aiding and abetting war crimes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.' By a 4-1 vote, the Chamber held that "specific direction"
is an essential element of liability for the actus reus of aiding and abetting the crimes of murder,
extermination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and persecution as crimes against humanity
and/or violations of the laws or customs of war. It also held that Perigi6 lacked the necessary
"effective control" over his subordinates to subject him to command responsibility for their
violations of the laws and customs of war.
Perigi's conviction in 2011 marked the ICTY's first judgment against an official of the for-
mer Yugoslav Army for crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 Beginning in August
1993, Perigi6 served as the chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, the most senior
VJ officer in the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (Yugoslavia). Between 1993 and 1995, the VJ
provided military and logistical assistance to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and to the Army of the Serbian Krajina (SVK) in Croatia.
The trial chamber, with one judge dissenting, found Perigi6 guilty, as an aider and abettor,
of VRS crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica,3 including murder, inhumane acts (injuring and
wounding civilians, inflicting serious injuries, forcible transfer), and persecutions as crimes
against humanity, as well as murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs
of war.' Again with one judge dissenting, it also found Perigid guilty, as a superior, for failing
to punish SVK crimes in Zagreb, including murder and inhumane acts (injuring and wound-
ing civilians) as crimes against humanity, and for murder and attacks on civilians as violations
of the laws or customs ofwar.5 The trial chamber sentenced Perigi6 to twenty-seven years' con-
finement.
On appeal, the majority largely followed the approach of the dissenting judge in the trial
judgment.' One member of the appeals chamber dissented, arguing for Perigi's guilt along the
' Prosecutor v. Perigi6, Case No. IT-04-8 1-A, Appeals Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Feb. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter Appeals Judgment]. Documents of the ICTY cited herein are available at its website, http://www.icry.org.
2 Prosecutor v. Perilgi, Case No. IT-04-81-T (Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Trial Judgment].
3 Id., paras. 1815, 1820. The 1995 VRS attack on Srebrenica led to the mass murder of some eight thousand
Bosniaks, in what Kofi Annan labeled the worst crime to be committed on European soil since World War II. 'May
We All Learn and Act on the Lessons ofSrebrenica', Says Secretary-General, in Message to Anniversary Ceremony,
UN Press Release SG/SM/9993 (Nov. 7, 2005), at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9993.doc.
htm. The International Court of Justice later ruled that the attack constituted genocide. Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007
ICJ REP. 43, 199, para. 379 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org. See also The Fall of Srebrenica, Report
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, UN Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf.
4 Trial Judgment, para. 1838.
5 Id, paras. 1818, 1839.
6 During the appeal, Perigi6 personally addressed the Chamber and asked how, given the dissenting opinion in
the trial chamber, his responsibility could have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Perigi6 also said that
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lines taken by the majority in the trial chamber. The appeals chamber acquitted Perigi6 for
the VRS offenses in Bosnia on a point of law, and for the SVK offenses in Croatia following
a de novo factual review.
In terms of the offenses in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, the trial chamber had determined that
the actus reus of aiding and abetting by Perigid was "proved based on the finding that VJ assis-
tance 'had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the VRS."' Citing the 2009 ICTY
appeals judgment in the Mrkii case, the trial chamber ruled that "specific direction" is not a
required element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.' That is, the trial chamber did not
require proof that the VJ's actions in providing military support were specifically directed
toward assisting the VRS in committing crimes.
The appeals chamber disagreed, relying on Tadi, the first ICTY appeals judgment to
address the scope of aiding and abetting liability some ten years prior to the Mrki'ruling (para.
26). The Tadil appeals judgment had stated that "[t]he aider and abettor carries out acts spe-
cifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain spe-
cific crime . . ., and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime."'
The appeals chamber claimed that " [t]o date, no judgement of the Appeals Chamber has found
cogent reasons to depart from the definition of aiding and abetting liability adopted in the
Tadil Appeal Judgement" (para. 28). The Chamber further claimed that while the Mrkii
appeals judgment did state that specific direction was not an essential ingredient of the actus
reus of aiding and abetting, it did so "in passing" and not as the result of "the most careful con-
sideration" required for the Chamber to depart from its holding in Tadie (paras. 33, 34)."o
The appeals chamber also acknowledged that other ICTY appellate judgments addressing
aiding and abetting liability had not analyzed the issue of specific direction, but it observed
that those cases involved actions proximate to the crimes of the principal perpetrators. Where
there is such proximity, the Chamber said, specific direction "may be demonstrated implicitly
through discussion of other elements of aiding and abetting liability, such as substantial con-
tribution" (para. 38). But the majority found that Perigi6's acts of assistance to the VRS had
been remote from its crimes, that the VRS and the VJ were independent of each other and
located in different geographic regions, and that there was no evidence that Perigi6 had been
present when the VRS planned or committed criminal acts." As a result, the appeals chamber
held that "explicit consideration of specific direction is required" (para. 39).
the "world did not prohibit the waging of war" and asked the appeals chamber to consider how his case would affect
the chiefs of staff of armies around the world. He emphasized that "[n]ever before was a chief of the General Staff
ofan army indicted and convicted for crimes that were committed by members ofanother army in another country."
Transcript of Appeals Hearing 84, 85 (Oct. 30, 2012).
7 Appeals Judgment, para. 17 (quoting Trial Judgment, para. 1627).
' Id. (quoting Trial Judgment, para. 126, and citing Prosecutorv. Mrkli, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, AppealsJudg-
ment, para. 159 (May 5, 2009)).
9 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 229(iii) (July 15, 1999), quotedin Appeals
Judgment, para. 26 (emphasis added).
10 Quoting, in the second instance, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para.
109 (Mar. 24, 2000).
" Referring to the trial records, the dissenting judge felt that Perigi6 had "facilitated the large-scale crimes of the
VRS through the provision of considerable and comprehensive aid" constituting "a prime example of conduct to
which aiding and abetting liability should attach." Appeals Judgment, Partially Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Liu,
para. 9 [hereinafter Liu Dissent]. Judge Liu persuasively referred to points from the trial judgment, including that
Perigi6 had institutionalized the provision of assistance to the VRS, that he had the power to approve or deny
requests, that the assistance "sustained the very life line of the VRS," that Perigi6 "did not believe that the VRS had
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Accordingly, the Chamber proceeded to analyze
(i) Peri i6's role in shaping and implementing [Yugoslavia's] polic' of supporting the VRS;
(ii) whether [Yugoslavia's] policy of supporting the VRS was specifically directed towards
the commission of crimes by the VRS; and (iii) whether Perigki either implemented the
SDC [Supreme Defense Council] policy of assisting the VRS in a way that specifically
directed aid to the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, or took action to provide such
aid outside the context of SDC-approved assistance. (Para. 47)
The majority found that Perigi6 had furthered the Yugoslav policy of supporting the VRS war
effort; however, providing general assistance that could be used for lawful and unlawful activ-
ities did not by itself suffice to prove that the assistance was specifically directed toward the
commission of crimes by VRS perpetrators (para. 58).
In reaching that conclusion, the appeals chamber engaged in two lines of inquiry: whether
the VRS was an organization "whose sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes"
and whether the SDC had "endorsed a policy of assisting VRS crimes" (para. 52). As to the first
question, the Chamber concurred with the trial chamber's conclusion that "the VRS was
not an organisation whose actions were criminal per se; instead, it was an army fighting a war"
(para. 53). As to the second, it found "no basis for concluding that it was SDC policy to spe-
cifically direct aid towards VRS crimes" (para. 55).
The appeals chamber also reversed Perigi's conviction as a superior for failing to punish
SVK members for the shelling of Zagreb in early May 1995. Perigid contended that he was not
the de jure superior of the soldiers who perpetrated the atrocities in question since they were
subject to a separate chain of command and that in any event he lacked the material ability to
discipline them at the time in question. The appeals chamber found that the trial chamber, by
neglecting the relevant portions oftwo witnesses' testimony in its analysis of Perili's command
responsibility, had "fail[ed] to provide a reasoned opinion" (para. 96). Reviewing the evidence
de novo, the appeals chamber held that the evidence did not demonstrate Perigi6's effective
control beyond a reasonable doubt and concluded that "a reasonable alternative interpretation
of the record is that Perigi6 could influence, but did not possess effective control over, the
Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the shelling of Zagreb" (para. 117). Because a finding that
Perigi6 had exercised effective control was not the sole reasonable inference from the totality
of the circumstantial evidence in this case, the appeals chamber held that his guilt had not been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the ICTY has contributed immensely to the development of international criminal
law, the decision serves as a reminder that the jurisprudence in this field is still unsettled, in that
even threshold questions on the elements of forms of liability and the doctrine of command
responsibility lack a coherent and consistent answer. More troubling is that the decision may
lessen or confuse the ICTY's accomplishments in establishing a historical record ofwar crimes
in the Balkans in the 1990s.
another significant source of assistance," and that from the early stages of the war Perigi6 was aware of "the VRS's
propensity to commit criminal acts." Id., paras. 7, 6 n.24, 8, respectively.
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The appeals chamber's approach to aiding and abetting is problematic from several perspec-
tives. On the one hand, it is far from clear whether (or when) any organization's "exclusive pur-
pose" might be the commission of crimes. 12 On the other, framing the test for determining
"specific direction" as endorsement unhelpfully blurs the lines between the actus reus and the
mens rea of accomplice liability. At one point, the majority stated that "[t] he Appeals Chamber
also underscores that its analysis of specific direction will exclusively address actus reus"
and then "acknowledges that specific direction may involve considerations that are closely
related to questions of mens rea" (para. 48). The result, according to the dissenting judge, is
that "[i] f specific direction is indeed part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability, it
could be argued that there is little difference between aiding and abetting and certain forms of
commission."
The majority concluded that "assistance from one army to another army's war efforts is
insufficient, in itself, to trigger individual criminal liability for individual aid providers absent
proof that the relevant assistance was specifically directed towards criminal activities" (para. 72).
Perigi6 argued that where remote conduct is at issue, not requiring proof of specific direction
is tantamount to a strict liability standard. Perigi6's argument may be applied to NATO's assis-
tance to Libyan "rebels" or Syrian opposition forces, but ultimately that reasoning is substan-
tively hollow. Perid did not concern a single instance of remotely provided military assistance
that was used by third parties, unknowingly to the provider, to perpetrate crimes for which the
provider was then held liable." As Judge Liu stated in his dissent:
Given that specific direction has not been applied in past cases with any rigor, to insist on
such a requirement now effectively raises the threshold for aiding and abetting liability.
This shift risks undermining the very purpose of aiding and abetting liability by allowing
those responsible for knowingly facilitating the most grievous crimes to evade responsi-
bility for their acts."
The majority claimed that its ruling "should in no way be interpreted as enabling military lead-
ers to deflect criminal liability by subcontracting the commission of criminal acts" (para. 72).
12 As one commentator observed, members of the Gestapo and the Interahamwe followed the law at times
over the course of their genocides, whether "dr[iving] on the correct side of the road [or] purchas[ing] food from
local merchants." James G. Stewart, The ICTYLoses Its Way on Complicity-Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 3, 2013,
9:00 AM).
13 Liu Dissent, para. 3 n.9.
14 During the closing arguments at Periik's trial, one judge, Judge Moloto, engaged in an intriguing dialogue
with a senior trial attorney from the Office of the Prosecutor. Judge Moloto compared the instances of aiding and
abetting charged against Periik with the operations of NATO commanders in Afghanistan and their continuing
to supply the Afghan security forces despite being aware of crimes committed by those forces. But the comparison
is only superficially analogous. While the Afghans have indeed committed offenses, these have not come close to
the scale of the VRS's offenses. Moreover, the VRS "wag[ed] a war that encompassed systematic criminal actions
against Bosnian Muslim civilians as a military strategy and objective." Id., para. 4 (quoting Trial Judgment, para.
1621). There is no valid Afghanistan parallel to the VRS siege of Srebrenica over the course of two-plus years, and
the subsequent massacre of thousands, which could not have occurred without VJ support. And at no point did
Perigi6 challenge or criticize the VRS or stop supplying it.
15 Id., para. 3. One commentator, Creighton law professor Sean Watts, in agreeing with the Periiit decision,
labeled the case a question of proof, not of difficulty determining the relevant standard of law. Watts claims that
to impute liability to Perifi6 requires more than is provided for under current international criminal law. To fill this
lacuna, Watts suggests that dereliction of duty be adopted as a criminal offense. See U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice Article 92, which criminalizes dereliction of duty. The U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial (2008 ed.) defines
an individual as derelict underArticle 92 when he or she "willfully or negligently fails to perform that person's duties
or when that person performs them in a culpably inefficient manner."
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Yet given the considerable evidence of Perigi's role in, and level of providing support to, the
VRS while knowing its members were committing atrocities, the ICTY's disclaimer about not
allowing the subcontracting of grievous crimes is unconvincing.
As for command responsibility, while the appeals chamber properly labeled the trial cham-
ber's handling of the two witnesses' testimony as an error of law, the resulting de novo review
was not the required outcome. It afforded no deference to any of the trial chamber's factual
findings regarding effective control, not just those stemming from the questioned witness tes-
timony.
Consequently, an appeals judgment of fewer than fifty pages now serves as the factual record
instead of a trial judgment of almost six hundred pages. The ICTY claims as one of its achieve-
ments establishing "beyond a reasonable doubt crucial facts related to crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia."" But substituting appellate factual findings so disproportionately inferior
in scope and detail for the trial chamber's factual findings figuratively-and literally-lessens
the ICTY historical record of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
Following on the heels of the Gotovina case," Perifid is the latest in a series of high-profile
ICTY appellate acquittals. And much like Croatia in responding to the exoneration of its gen-
erals, Serbia flew Perigi6 to Belgrade amid considerable fanfare. Prime Minister Ivica Da6i
claimed Perigi's case was "of a tremendous importance for Serbia and the Serbian people
because it proves that Serbia didn't carry out military aggression against Bosnia and Croatia.""
This belief was only heightened in May 2013 when an ICTY trial chamber announced the
acquittals of the former Serbian secret police chief and his deputy 9 for their role in forming,
directing, and paying special unitS20 that drove non-Serbs from portions ofBosnia and Croatia.
Acquittals in a case where the prosecutor had sought life sentences further suggests dissonance
within the ICTY.2 1
The larger effects of the decision remain to be seen. One cogent question, for example, is
if and how the Special Court for Sierra Leone will refer to Periii in the appellate case of former
Liberian president Charles Taylor. Taylor was found guilty both for aiding and abetting, where
Perilii might factor into the analysis, and for his role in planning war crimes, where Perid
would have no application.22
16 ICTY, Achievements, at http://www.icty.org/sid/324.
1" Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, AppealsJudgment (Nov. 16, 2012) (acquitting Ante Gotovina
and Mladen Marka ).
8 Marija Ristic, Serbia Welcomes Hague Decision to Clear Perisic, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Mar. 1,
2013) (quoting Ivica Dai6), at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-greets-perisic-s-icty-acquittal.
Attention now turns to whether and how the acquittals of Serbians accused of war crimes in Croatia will affect the
resolution of the ICJ case between the two countries, Application ofthe Convention on thePrevention and Punishment
ofthe Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia).
'9 Prosecutor v. Stanigit, Case No. IT-03-69-T (May 30, 2013) (acquitting Jovica Stanigi6 and Franko
Simatovi6).
2
0 Among these units were Arkan's Tigers, the Red Berets, and the Skorpions, which committed some of the
greatest atrocities in the conflict.
21 One expert contended that through recent ICTY cases "[the entire doctrine of command responsibility has
been ditched" and " [s]o has the liability for aiding and abetting." Marlise Simons, UN. CourtAcquits2 Serbs of War
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2013, at A4 (quoting Eric Gordy, University College London). For additional crit-
icism of the recent decisions, see Marlise Simons,Judge at War Crimes Tribunal Faults Acquittals ofSerb and Croat
Commanders, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2013, at A4.
22 For the trial chamber's judgments on the merits and on sentencing, see Triestino Mariniello, Case Report:
Prosecutor v. Taylor, in 107 AJIL 424 (2013).
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Assessing the efficacy and legitimacy of the ICTY cannot be outcome based. One may fear,
however, that decisions that radically shift from trial judgment findings of guilt and the impo-
sition of lengthy sentences to appellate judgments of outright acquittal and release might result
in a lack of predictability and confidence in the tribunal writ large. Sixteen years into its juris-
prudence, the ICTY should be more, not less, predictable. Yet in the wake of Perifid, the ele-
ments of aiding and abetting are murkier than ever. Sadly, the ICTY is undermining what
would and should be the development of its own case law, and thus its contribution to devel-
oping international law. In issuing appellate acquittals like Perdid, the ICTY, whose stated
goals and accomplishments include holding leaders accountable, bringing justice to victims,
and giving them a voice,2 3 may become "an instrument for collectivizing innocence rather than
for individualizing guilt, . . . indeed the opposite of what many of us had hoped it would be."24
CHRISTOPHER JENKS
SMUDedman School ofLaw
State recognition- effect of unrecognized state ' accession to multilateral treaty- obligations of universal
value under general international law- copyright protection under Berne Convention
KOREAN FILM EXPORT & IMPORT CORP. v. FujI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. 65 Minshii 3275.
Saik5 Saibansho (Supreme Court of Japan), December 8, 2011.
On December 8, 2011, the Japanese Supreme Court decided that the accession to a mul-
tilateral treaty by a state not recognized by Japan cannot create obligations between Japan and
that state except with respect to obligations of universal value under general international law.1
The case arose in the specific context of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 2 but has broader implications for the operation of
multilateral treaties in general.
The Copyright Act ofJapan protects, in addition to works ofJapanese nationals and works
first published in Japan, "works ... with respect to which Japan has the obligation to grant
protection under an international treaty" (Art. 6). International treaties for the purpose of
this provision include the Berne Convention, which Japan ratified in 1975.' Article 3 of
that Convention provides that its protections shall apply to "authors who are nationals of
one of the countries of the Union [that is, countries to which the Convention applies], for
23 ICTY, Achievements, supra note 16.
24 Marko Milanovic, The Limits ofAiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTYAppeals Chamber Acquits Momcilo
Perisic, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 11, 2013), at http://www.ejiltalk.org.
' Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 8,2011, Hei 21 (Ju) nos. 602,603,65 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU
[MINSHU] 3275, translated at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2011.12.08-2009.-Ju-.No..
602%2C.603.html (provisional trans.). For the lower court judgments in this case, see T5kya Chih6 Saibansho
[Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Dec. 14,2007, Hei 18 (wa) no. 6062,65 MINSHu 3329 [hereinafter District Court judgment];
Chiteki Zaisan Kata Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] Dec. 24, 2008, Hei 20 (ne) no. 10011, 65 MINSHU
3363 [hereinafter High Court judgment], available athttp://www.courts.go.jp. The translations in this report are
by the author.
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as amendedJuly 24, 1971,
1161 UNTS 3, available at http://www.wipo.int.
3 Chosakukenha [CopyrightAct], LawNo. 48 of 1970, Art. 6, translatedarhttp://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, WIPO-Administered Treaties, athttp://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
berne/.
2013] 627
